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Tenancy By Entireties in
Pennsylvania
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DIVORCE AND THE UNITY THEORY
In Alles vs. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604, (1907), for the first time
the question of a divorce of the spouses and its effect upon
the estate by entireties came directly before the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania for solution. The facts were that
Louisa Alles was married to John P. Reis and the two held
a lot of ground as tenants by entireties. A municipal lien
was filed against the lot in question in the name of the wife
alone and a sale held under this lien, and after the divorce
of the parties the former wife bought the land as sold and
then claimed a full fee simple title covering the entire interest
in the land. The present case was one stated to determine
the marketable title of this real estate.
After disposing of the question as to what was purchased
by the wife at the sale under the lien and a determination
that the lien was a nullity and that the sale passed no title,
the Court, Per Mitchell, C. J., approached the main ques-
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tion of the case whether the estate by entireties was severed by the subsequent divorce of the husband and wife. Said
the learned Chief Justice:
"The argument for the change by divorce from an estate
by entireties to a tenancy in common rests on the assumption that, as the basis of the estate is the unity of person,
a severance of that unity carries with it a severance of the
estate; that as after divorce an estate by entireties could not
be created by the parties it cannot be continued. But this
view fails to give due weight to the rule that the quality of
the estate is determined at its inception. It arises not out
of unity of person alone, but out of unity of person at the
time of the grant. 'If an estate be made to a man and woman and their heirs, before marriage, and after (ward) they
marry, the husband and wife have moities between them:'
Coke Lift. 187b; and see 2 Cruise's Digest, 494 and 2 Plowden
483, cited in Stuckey vs. Keefe's Exrs., 26 Pa. 397. No
stronger illustration could be given. If subsequent unity of
person cannot change a tenancy in common to one by entireties, e converso a subsequent severance of the unity of person ought not to change a tenancy by entireties to one in
common."
Consequently, the judgment of the lower court founded
upon the assumption that divorce of the spouses had changed
the estate into a tenancy in common, was reversed- and
judgment directed to be entered for the defendant.
That the question of divorce of the spouses, although
not directly passed upon, was before the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania almost a century before will appear by reference to the case of Lodge vs. Hamilton, 2 S. & R-., 491, (1816).
Strangely enough, furthermore, this case was not presented
to the court in the argument of Alles vs. Lyon and the case
is not mentioned in the opinion of the Supreme Court. See
Blank vs. Kline, 155 Pa. 613, (1893).
In O'Malley vs. O'Malley, 272 Pa. 528, (1922), there is
the latest expression by the Supreme Court upon the effect of
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a divorce on a tenancy by entireties. The facts were that
the plaintiff, Mary O'Malley, brought an action in assumpsit
for an accounting of the rents of a property which had been
conveyed to, the defendant, Patrick O'Malley and Mary
O'Malley, while they were husband and wife, but which after they were separated he had leased and appropriated the
whole proceeds of the lease to his own use and continued so
to do though they were now divorced.
After disposing of some questions of practice the Court,
per Simpson, J., said:
"Upon the main question the authorities, in other jurisdictions, are in hopeless conflict. Admittedly the great
weight thereof is that by a divorce the unity which is essential to an estate by entireties is destroyed, and hence it
is converted into a tenancy in common: 21 Cyc. 1201; 13 R.
C. L. 1121-3; 30 L. R. A. 333 n; 10 L. R. A. (n. s.) 463 n;
L. R. A. 1915 C 396, n. We have held, however, that after
a divorce the estate retains the incidents which pertained to
it at its inception: Alles vs. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604. True, the
question raised in that case affected only the right of possession while the former husband and wife were still alive,
but the reasoning of the opinion applies equally well to the
accruing income and since it is sound in principal we intend
to apply it thereto. Indeed, when the cases elsewhere are
examined, it will be found that this ancient estate is treated
as converted into a tenancy in common, largely because it
is believed this will solve some, if not most, of the difficulties which would otherwise arise in regard to it after a divorce. We do not feel justified, however, in altering the intention appearing in the deed itself, merely because difficulties will arise if we do not; especially since the conclusion
we have reached will cause most, if not all, of them to disappear."
Following this, the Court discusses the various incidents of an estate by entireties and concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to an accounting from the defendant, the same
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to begin with the date of the divorce of the spouses but without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to proceed for the balance of the claim between the time of separation and the
date of the decree of divorce.
NATURE OF ENTIRETY ESTATE
The estate by entireties is founded upon the common
law theory of the unity of husband and wife. To quote
the language of Lewis, C. J., in Stuckey vs. Keefe, by virtue of the marriage contract as consummated, there is a
"matrimonial union" or the creation of a "legal personage."
As was stated by Royce, J., in Brownson vs. Hull, 16 Vt. 309,
(18W), a conveyance to husband and wife is not in a legal
sense a conveyance to two persons but to those who for this
purpose are accounted but one person in the law. Our own
Gibson, C. J., expresses the same idea in Lancaster County
Bank vs. Stauffer, 10 Pa. 398, (1849), when referring to
the position of husband and wife before the law he stated
that the common law is unable to conceive of husband and
wife in respect to property as civil existences.
Another trite common law principle is the doctrine of
control by the husband as the head of the family of the property belonging to his wife. As to her real property, he was
practically the owner during his lifetime and as to her personalty, he became, upon marriage, the absolute owner of all
her choses in possession and the prospective owner of all
choses in action which he would reduce to possession.
This idea of dominion or control was applied to estates
by entireties as well as to other property belonging to the
wife in severalty. The law on this subject as well as the
change that has taken place by the Married Women's Property Statutes is thus stated by Simpson, J., in O'Malley vs.
O'Malley, 272 Pa. at page 532, (1922):
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"Before the passage of the various statutes relating to
the property of a married woman, a husband who held with
his wife an estate by entireties, had absolute control of it
and its income, exactly as if he were the owner in fee; he
could alien it and the purchaser would obtain an estate for
the life of the husband and an absolute estate in remainder,
if the latter survived his wife; if waste was committed he
could sue in his own name and for his sole benefit, to recover
for the resultant injury, even though the effect of the waste
was to render practically valueless the property which would
be the wife's if she survived him: Fairchild vs. Chastelleux,
1 Pa. 176. This, however, was not an incident of the estate
by entireties, but of the marital relation, and applied to the
property of the wife, whether owned in fee simple or other-wise. All this was changed, however, by these acts, and
though the estate by entireties remained as theretofore, (Diver vs. Diver, 56 Pa. 106; Bramberry's Est. 156 Pa. 628;
Meyer's Est. (No. 1), 232 Pa. 89), a purchaser of the husband's interest acquired no right of possession during the
wife's life, either alone or with her (McCurdy vs. Canning,
64 Pa. 38; Meyer's Est. (No. 1), 232 Pa. 89); neither husband nor wife could sell even the expectancy of survivorship,
without the joinder of the other, nor could a valid title to
the immediate interest or expectancy be obtained by a sheriff's sale or under proceedings in bankruptcy, Beihl vs. Martin, 236 Pa. 519."
As suggested above, following the Married Women's
Property Act of 1848, came the case of McCurdy vs. Canning,
64 Pa. 37, (1870), the facts of which were that on the 20th
day of August, 1855 a conveyance of land was made to Robert Canning and Eliza Canning, which under the decisions
cited heretofore, created a tenancy by entirety. Later, a
judgment was obtained against Robert Canning and in 1859
his interest in the premises was sold and this case is one of
ejectment by the purchasers of the above interest against
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Robert Canning and Eliza, his wife, for the possession of the
premises in question.
Thayer, J., of the lower court directed a verdict for the
plaintiffs for the husband's interest and a verdict for the
wife for her interest, reserving the point whether under the
deed the plaintiffs can recover at all in this action. Later,
the court entered judgment for the defendant on the point reserved and discussed the incidents of the estates by entireties
and observed that at common law from the unity of husband and wife and due to the subjection of the latter to the
former, the husband had the control of the estate during his
life and could convey or mortgage it during the period, citing
Fairchild vs. Chastelleux, 1 Pa. 181. He further argued
that if the husband could now convey or mortgage for the period of his own life, it would follow that the same interest
might be taken in execution and sold by the sheriff for the
same period, and that the purchaser of such an interest would
be entitled to recover the possession during the life of the
husband by an action of ejectment. But, said the learned
court, the Act of April 11, 1848 interposes its insuperable bar
to such a result and consequently possession could not be
given to the purchaser without destroying the estate of the
wife protected as it were by the terms of the Married Women's Property Act of 1848, and in conclusion the Court remarked: "These considerations lead us to the conclusion that
one who without the consent of the wife purchases the husband's interest in real estate in which both husband and wife
are seized of the entirety, and the possession of the whole of
which she is entitled equally with him, does not acquire,
during the wife's life, any right to the possession, either jointly with him or to her entire exclusion. Practically these two
propositions are not alternatives but the same, for we can
as easily marry her to a stranger as marry her possessions to
his without destroying her estate."
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court
below "for the reasons so well assigned by the learned judge
(Judge Thayer), in his able opinion in the court below."
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In view of the above law, it may with propriety be
asked, especially in view of the Married Women's Property
Acts, just what is the particular interest of one of the spouses
in an estate by entireties which may be the subject of either
conveyance or lien.
In Brownson vs. Hull, 16 Vt. 309, (1844), per Royce, J.,
the interest is likened to an estate for life or to a defeasible
or contingent estate. In Bates vs. Seely, 46 Pa. 248, (1863),
Woodward, J., characterizes the estate as a contingent remainder and in Hetzel vs. Lincoln, 216 Pa. 60, (1906), Brown,
J., in speaking of a judgment against the husband and as to
his estate by entirety: "The judgment was a lien upon the defeasible estate of the husband."
In Beihl vs. Martin, 236 Pa. 519, (1912), Stewart, J., refers to the interest of the spouse as a "contingent expectant
interest." As to the rights of the spouses, Stewart, J., declared:
"A little reflection upon the nature of the estate by entireties should make it apparent, we think, that while the estate continues, it is utterly impossible for either party, without the other joining, to sell or assign his or her interest
therein, even the expectancy or survivorship."
In view of all these expressions, the question properly
arises whether, since the Married Women's Property Acts,
the interest of either spouse in the estate by entirety is the
subject of any lien at the instance of a separate creditor.
FLEEK VS. ZILLHAVER
In Fleek vs. Zillhaver, 117 Pa. 213 (1887), the following
were the facts:
The real estate in question was devised to Charles T.
Holcomb and Mary, his wife, by will of Mary's father, admitted to probate on April 6, 1854. On August 8, 1877 People's Savings Bank entered a judgment against Charles T.
Holcomb for $1571. This judgment was revived by several
writs and on June 10, 1882 the judgment of revival was for
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$2033.72. On May 24, 1882 Mary Holcomb joined her husband in the execution of a mortgage upon the land devised
to Frank R. Fleek for $1140. The mortgage was recorded
May 25, 1882 and later assigned to Helen M. Fleek, the use
plaintiff in this case. Previous to this time, there were no
judgments or mortgages against Mrs. Holcomb who later died
June 8, 1882. On June 13, 1882 a writ of fi.fa. was issued
by the bank on its judgment and a levy made upon the land
devised which was later sold by the sheriff on September 14,
1882 to the First Presbyterian Church of Meadville, and a
deed was executed therefore on October 2, 1882. On January
13, 1883 the Church conveyed the land to Fred Zillhaver, the
defendant.
On June 16, 1886 Frank R. Fleek, for the use of Helen
M. Fleek, issued a scire facias upon the mortgage on which
judgment was taken against Charles T- Holcomb for $1447
in default of appearance and plea. The terre tenant alone
made defense.
The question in the case was which lien was effective
against the land in question. The lower court held that inas-much as Mary Holcomb died prior to the entry of the
judgment of revival, the whole property descended to and became vested in her surviving husband; and hence on the 8th
of June 1882, there was a judgment against Charles T. Holcomb, which was a prior lien to the mortgage, although
Charles T. Holcomb had executed this mortgage. The Supreme Court, per Green, J., held that the estate of Holcomb
and wife was one of entireties and in reference to the priority of liens, stated the law as follows:
"As against the wife, the mortgage was undoubtedly the
first and indeed only lien. As against the husband, the
judgment was the first lien and the mortgage the second,
simply because the judgment was obtained before the mortgage was given. Had the wife survived, the mortgage would
certainly have had precedence to the exclusion of the judgment, because the estate bound by the lien of judgment
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was defeasible by the death of the husband before the wife.
For the same reason, if the husband survived the wife, the
estate of the latter was divested, and the mortgage only became operative against the husband because he had joined in
its execution. But as to him, it was not the first lien, he
having become subject to a judgment at a time anterior to
the giving of the mortgage."

BEIHL VS. MARTIN
The facts of this case, 263 Pa. 519, (1912), as stated
by Stewart, 3., were as follows:
"The property was acquired by deed of conveyance to
husband and wife in 1903. On the 2nd of July, 1909, the
husband, Ernest H. Beill, by the United States Circuit Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, was adjudged a
bankrupt, his wife not being a party to the proceeding or
consenting thereto. On the same day, several judgments
were entered against the husband by creditors who subsequently filed their respective claims with the referee appointed in the bankruptcy proceedings. In September 1911,
Beihl and his wife entered into articles of agreement with
William J. Martin, the defendant, whereby for a consideration of $6500 they covenanted to sell and convey the property so acquired to said Martin, by good and sufficient deed
in fee simple clear of any and all judgments and defects of
every kind, and particularly, clear of any contingent claims
of ownership or interest which might or could be enforced
against the said premises.' The matter is submitted on a
case stated which provides that if the court shall be of opinion that a proper deed from plaintiffs to defendant will convey such title to the said premises- as is stipulated for in
the agreement, then judgment shall be entered for the plaintiff."
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs could convey a good, marketable title according to the terms of the
recited agreement. It was further held that the fact of bank-
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ruptcy added nothing to the complications but that any one
claiming an interest in the premises through such an officer
would be in exactly the same position as a purchaser at sheriff's sale and that according to McCurdy vs. Canning, 64 Pa.
39, a sheriff's conveyance under the facts would give to the
purchaser no title whatsoever.
In referring to Fleek vs. Zillhaver, the discussion of
Stewart, J., may be set forth in the following propositions:
1. The interest of each spouse in the estate by entireties during their joint lives is a contingent, expectant, vested
interest.
2. This interest according to Carkhuff vs. Anderson, 3
Binn. 4, is the subject of lien by a judgment.
3. The interest cannot be sold under the lien in the
lifetime of the other spouse.
4. The lien must be held subject to (1) extinction by
the predeceasing of the spouse whose interest is liened, (2)
extinction by alienation of the entirety estate by the joint
act of the two spouses.
5. As execution on such judgment may not properly issue until the death of the other spouse, the one whose interest is liened surviving, such execution is "not upon an expectancy but upon an actual existing estate."
In commenting upon Fleek vs. Zillhaver, Stewart, J.,
states:
"The case of Fleek vs. Zillhaver, 117 Pa. 231, marks
the extremest limit to which we have gone in subjecting estates of this character to demands of separate creditors * *
* * But for that case, we might well have rested this on what
we regard as the decided weight of authority in other jurisdictions touching the questions here directly involved. * *
'The
* * (Quoting from 9 L. R. A. (N. S.)-page 1026),
weight of authority founded as we think upon the better
reasoning, is that such acts (the reference being to enabling
acts with respect to rights of property in married women)
do not in any way affect estate by entirety, except that they
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deprive the husband of the right to the possession and enjoyment of the property held by himself and wife in this
manner, to the exclusion of the wife. Such acts have the
effect of freeing the wife's property from any liability to his
creditors, and that, therefore, her right to the possession and
enjoyment of property held in common with her-husband by
entirety cannot in any way be interfered with-by his creditors; and hence the entire property, during their joint lives,
is free from judgment or execution lien directed against
either of them.' In this conclusion we entirely concur, saving, however, whatever exception may be required to give
effect as above indicated to the doctrine asserted in Fleek vs.
Zillhaver."
For a more complete history of the vicissitudes of the
Beihls and their entirety estate, see Meyer's Est. (No. 1) 232
Pa. 89 (1911) ; Meyer's Est. (No. 2) 232 Pa. 95, (1911) ; Weiss
-vs. Beihl, 232 Pa. 97, (1911).
DISCUSSION
From the cases already discussed, the following propositions of law may be collated:
1. A judgment against the husband cannot be enforced
in execution by levy and sale of his interest in the entirety
estate during the life of the wife. McCurdy vs. Canning.
2. A judgment against the husband will take priority
over a mortgage executed by both husband and wife subsequently and embracing the entirety estate, in case the wife
predeceases her husband. Fleek vs. Zillhaver.
3. Neither a judgment against the husband nor his individual bankruptcy will preclude the husband and wife from
conveying the estate by entireties and giving good title
against such judgment or bankruptcy proceedings. Beihl vs.
Martin.
4. The interest of neither spouse can be sold voluntarily
or adversely during the life of the other without the latter's
assent. Beihl vs. Martin.
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Assuming that the above propositions are correct statements of the law as drawn from the above cited cases, the
following questions will be pertinent:
1. If a joint absolute conveyance of the entirety estate
passes -title free of a prior judgment against the husband,
how is a joint conditional conveyance (mortgage) distinguished with different effect?
2. Is it legally possible to have a lien on an interest in
real property, which interest cannot be legally conveyed by
the owner?
3. The lien of judgment against the interest of a spouse
in an entirety estate only becoming enforceable after the
death of the opposite spouse, the one whose interest is liened surviving, is this result attained upon the theory that there
has been a stay in execution by rule of law or does the lien
operate on after-acquired property?
4. Suppose there is a judgment against the husband
and subsequently a mortgage by both husband and wife of
the entirety estate and in the lifetime of both spouses the
holder of the mortgage forecloses the same, will such foreclosure sale be subject to the lien of judgment?
The first three questions cannot be answered unequivocally and any opinion expressed must necessarily be based
upon the individual view taken of the two cases of Fleek vs.
Zillhaver and Beihl vs. Martin.
The answer to the fourth question will be found in the
case of Leet vs. Miller, 6 Pa. D. R. 725, (1896), wherein the
facts were that a tract of land was held by husband and wife
by entireties and subsequent to the conveyance judgments
were entered against the husband and later the husband and
wife executed and delivered a mortgage on the same premises.
The mortgage was foreclosed and the court held in a contest
over the distribution of the funds that judgment creditors of
the husband had no claim upon the balance of the proceeds
of sale after the satisfaction of the mortgage and that the
judgment creditors of the husband could not require that the
funds be impounded or that security be given in order to se-
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cure the application of the funds to their judgments in case
the husband survived the wife. On the contrary, the balance in distribution is payable to and was awarded the husband and wife together. See also Trust Co. vs. Worley, 16
Pa. D. R. 250, (1906).
As to the case of Fleek vs. Zillhaver, it is submitted that
the results obtained by the learned court are not in harmony
with the unity theory of husband and wife. If the analogy
of partnership holding of land is applied to this situation a
result more in accord with the logic of our decisions would be
obtained. If A and B hold the title to lands as partners, no
judgment against either partner individually and no mortgage given by either partner individually will constitute a
lien upon the legal title to the lands so held. A lien can
only be obtained by process against the partners jointly or
by their joint assent. These principles are clearly set forth
in our Pennsylvania decisions and are found carried out in
the Uniform Partnership Act of 1915 in Sections 24, 25 and
26.
The title by entirefies is a joint title held by the husband
and wife as a matrimonial unit, as the partnership title is a
joint title held by the partners as a commercial unit. In
neither case should a lien against an individual composing
the union be considered as a lien against the joint or unit
title.
STATUTES
By Section 3, Act May 10, 1921, P. L. 438, at page 440,
an estate by entireties may be subjected to a charge for the
support of either of the spouses who is an inmate of any asylum, hospital, home or other institution maintained in whole or
in part by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and such
liability for support is declared to be the joint liability of
such owners to the extent of such order and may be so enforced in case the separate estate is not sufficieut.
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The Act of the 24th of May, 1923, P. L. 446, authorizes
the sale of real estate held by entireties by husband and wife
wvhen an order of support has been secured again'.t the hus
band who has neglected to comply with the same or whose
whereabouts are unknown or who has absented himself flom
this Commonwealth, prescribing procedure to be followed,
permitting husband and wife to testify, providing for disposition of proceeds from such sale and granting a divorced
woman the same rights under the acts as a wife.
Section 2 of the Revised Price Act of June 7, 1917, P. L.
388, provides in the last paragraph of the section that the
jurisdiction of the several courts in the particular cases,
thereinbefore mentioned, shall extend to the ownrship or interest in real estate "by husband and wife as ten'ants by entireties." This section was amended for the purpose of
broadening the classification of cases covered by the Act of
Mzay 2, 1919, P. L. 111.
INHERITANCE TAXES
The Estate Tax Act of September 8, 1916, c. 463, p. 777,
sec. 201, of the Acts of Congress, provides for a transfer tax
upon the net estate of every decedent dying after the passage
of this act whether a resident or non-resident of the United
States, said tax being upon a graduated scale starting with
one per centum of the amount of such net estate not in excess of $50,000, exempting, however, in the case of residents,
the first $50,000.
Sub-division C, of Section 202, in describing the estates
affected .by the Act, provides, inter alia, as follows:
"To the extent of the interest therein held jointly or as
tenants by the entirety by the decedent and any other person, or deposited in banks or other institutions in their joint
names and payable to either or the survivor, except such part
thereof as may be shown to have originally belonged to such
other person and never to have belonged to the decedent."
Under the New York Tax Law of 1916, c. 323, Sec. 83,
the provision is as follows:
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"Whenever property is held in the joint names of two or
more persons, or as tenants by the entirety * * * * the
right of the surviving tenant by the entirety, * * * * to the

immediate ownership or possession and enjoyment of such
property shall be deemed a transfer taxable under the provisions of this chapter in the same manner as though the
whole property to which such transfer relates belonged absolutely to the deceased tenant by the entirety, * * * * and
had been bequeathed to the surviving tenant by the entirety,
S* * * by such deceased tenant by the entirety, * * * * by
wvill."

In Dunn's Est., 236 N. Y. 461, it was held that an entirety estate created prior to the Law of 1916 was not subject to the transfer tax following the case of In Re Lyon's
Est., 233 N. Y. 208, holding that any legislation attempting
to affect estates already vested would be unconstitutional.
In Palmer vs. Mansfield, 222 Mass. 263, (1915), 110 N.
E. 283, it was held that under the Inheritance Tax Law, St.
1909, c-490, Sec. 4, Par. 1, as amended by St. 1912, c. 678,
Par. 1, taxing property passing "by the laws regulating intestate succession," when a wife was tenant by the entirety
with her husband of realty, upon his death she was not liable to the inheritance tax upon one half thereof, as taking
it by survivorship, since by the death of the husband no beneficial interest accrued to the other so as to create succession
by survivorship. Per Crosby, J:
"Upon the death of the testator no estate in the property
in question passed to his widow. It belonged to her from the
time when the tenancy by the entirety was created."
Our own Act of July 11, 1917, P. L. 832, entitled "An
Act for the imposition and collection of certain Inheritance
Taxes" did not by any provision affect or attempt to tax estates by entirety.
The present Act of July 20, 1919, P. L. 521, entitled "An
Act providing for the imposition and collection of certain taxes
upon the transfer of property passing from a decedent, etc."
likewise does not by any of its provisions affect estates by
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entirety. In Section 45 the word "transfer" is defined as including "the passing of property or any interest therein, in
possession or enjoyment, present or future, by distribution,
by statute, decent, devise, bequest, grant, deed, bargain, sale
or otherwise."
CONCLUSION
In surveying the cases embraced in this discussion we
find that they include about a century of Pennsylvania decisional law. The field of law concerning entirety estates
has been fairly, although not exhaustively, covered. The
leading cases have been analyzed. It is gratifying to find
the harmony which has been maintained through this hundred years of decisions. The theme of all these cases is
the unity of the spouses.
"Fri. Come, come with me, and we will
make short work;
For, by your leave, you shall not stay alone,
Till holy church incorporate two in one."
Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene VI.
But t*o decisions have been reviewed which appear
to strike a discordant note. Fleek vs. Zillhaver is an ill considered case. irreconcilable with the expressions of Stewart,
J., in Beihl vs. Martin and should have been expressly overruled.
Blease vs. Anderson is out of -harmony with the general doctrine of the irrelevancy of intention and yet the facts
are peculiar. The wife before the conveyance was a tenant
in common with a fifth interest. The conveyance simply added
to this already existing fractional interest by a "distinctly
defined" quantum to the wife and a correspondingly precise
fractional interest to the husband. These were theoretically
two separate conveyances in one. Will the law stand on
these distinctions or is Blease vs. Anderson the starting point
for the doctrine that husband and wife may now hold as tenants in common in a deed merely so specifying, thus over-
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ruling Stuckey vs. Keefe and its long line, or will the distinction be made between a conveyance merely stating the holding as tenants in common and one distinctly and precisely defining the fractional interest as i. e. a half, a third etc.?
Jan. 15th, 1925.
A. J. WHITE HUTTON
Note Bene. The above theme is not an excathedra delivery and the writer will gratefully appreciate any errors or
omissions detected by the gentle reader.
A. J. W. H.
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MOOT COURT
THREE CHARITIES VS. COUNTY CODISSIONERS
Charit-es--"Purely Public"

Charities-Tax

Exemption

of

Public

Charities-Article IX, Sec. 1, Constitution of Pennsylvania
Act of July 17, 1919, P. L, 1021, as Amended by
Act of April 9, 1921, P. L. 119.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Three corporations: (a) for the refuge of disabled negroes aged
sixty and over; (b) for aged people whose ancestors, sixty years ago.
were all of Scotch descent; (c) for aged people of the Hebrew race.
In all cases the inmates were lodged, clothed, fed and cared for, paying valuable sums, never more than half of the actual cost of what
they received. The County Commissioners decided that the Institutions were, while charities, not purely public charities, and therefore not exempt from taxation.
Kornreich, for Plaintiff.
Josephs, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Rupp, J. The Constitution of Pennsylvania, Article IX, Section
1, authorized the General Assembly to exempt from taxation, by
general laws, "Institutions of purely public charity." The first exercise of the power thus given was the passage of the Act of May
14, 1874, P. L. 158, later amended by the Act of May 29, 1901, P. I,.
319, and the Act of June 13, 1911, P. I. 898. The law as ordained
by this act and its subsequent amendments was, "all ----- institutions of--- benevolence or charity---- maintained by public or
private charity ------ be and are hereby exempted from all- --- tax."
The Acts of 1874, 1901 and 1911, supra, were repealed b)y the Act of
July 17, 1919, P. L. 1021. This act, which also contained the exemption provision just quoted, added that all property not used in
the actual promotion of the purposes for which the charity was
maintained should be subject to taxation. It also provided that
property, real or personal, in actual use and occupation by a char-
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Ity would be subject to taxation unless the persons, association or
corporation occupying the same should be seized of the legal or
equitable title in the realty and be possessor of the personal property absolutely.
The Act of 1919 was amended by the Act of April 9, 1921, P. L.
119, said act providing that no charitable institution should be exempt from taxation unless "the entire revenue derived by the same
be applied to the support of and to increase the efficiency and facilities thereof, the repair and necessary increase of grounds and
buildings thereof, and for no other purposes." This act also exempted such institutions from township taxes which were seemingly
overlooked in the wording of the Act of 1919.
Under the Constitution of Pennsylvania and the statutes enacted, the following questions must be answered before it can finally
be determined whether or not a charity is entitled to exemption
from taxation either in whole or in part:
1. Is it purely public charity?
2. Is all the property held by the charity used in the actual
promotion of its purposes?
3. Is the charity seized of the legal or equitable title to the
realty it occupies and is it owner of its personal property absolutely?
4. Are all the revenues derived from the charity applied solely
to the support, maintenance or improvement of the charity?
In the case before us there is seemingly no dispute involving the
three latter questions, therefore the only matter left for the disposal of the Court is a determination of whether or not the plaintiffs
are or are not "purely public charities." A purely public charity is
not necessarily one controlled by the state, but extends to private
charitable institutions which are not administered for any individual
gain. Methodist Episcopal Church vs. Philadelphia, 266 Pa. 405. To
this rule there has seemingly been appended a drastic limitation.
Even though a charitable institution be not operated for individual
gain and all income is appropriated to the upkeep of the property
and the conduct of the institution, it is not a purely public charity
if it assumes any definite objective relative to the class or classes
of persons to whom it wishes to be of assistance. "The true rule to
be applied," says the Court in Friends' Boarding Home vs. Bucks
County Commissioners, 80 Pa. Superior 475, at page 478, "in making
the test in any such case, was stated thus in Donohugh's Appeal, 86
Pa. 306, a case usually cited when the question is involved and always with approval: ("The essential features of a public use are,
that it is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the Indefinite public. It is this indefinite or unrestricted quality that gives
it

its public character.")
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In each of the three appeals before the Court we have instances
of where the benefits to be bestowed are limited to a class. In the
first the beneficiaries can only be disabled negroes aged sixty and
over; in the second they can only be aged people whose ancestors
sixty years ago were of Scotch descent; in the third they can only
be aged people of the Hebrew race. A restriction may be made relative to those who may be the recipients of the benefits conferred by a
charity but in order that It shall be a purely public charity the limitation must be one to which all may achieve:
"A charity may restrict its admissions to a class of humanity
and still be public: it may be for the blind, the mute, the aged, for
infants, for men, for women, for different callings or trades by
which humanity earns Its bread and, as long as the classification
Is determined by some distinction which involuntarily affects or may
affect any of the whole people, although only a small number may
be directly benefited, it is public. But when the right of admission
depends on the fact of voluntary association with some particular
society, then a distinction is made which concerns the public at
large. The public is interested in the relief of its members because they are men, women and children: Phila. vs. Masonic Home,
160 Pa. 572."
Friends' Boarding Home vs. Commr's., supra.
Although In the Instances before the Court admission does not
depend on voluntary association it could hardly be urged that the
distinctions made could involuntarily affect any of the whole people.
The whole people could hardly be negroes aged sixty and over;
neither could they be all of Scotch descent and neither could they
be of the Hebrew race. The limitations are ones to which the
whole people could not possibly aspire.
Although it is difficult for the Court to understand why absence
of personal gain should not be the proper criterion by which to
judge whether or not a charity should be taxed, the authorities cited
plainly point the the path of duty. Although the classes involved
are allowed to segregate themselves socially and commercially in
the days of their prosperity, they must deny themselves that privilege in the days of their adversity or be taxed. The rulings of the
Board of County Commissioners are affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
It is not necessary that a charity should be applicable to all
sortg and classes of human beings, In order to be public and "purely
public." The population Is composed of young, adults, aged; of
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black and white; of people of Soctch origin; and those whose ancestors came from other countries. It would be a little absurd to
say that a charity for boys, for girls, for whites, for blacks, was
not purely public because not available to men or women, to blacks,
or whites. Charities must limit themselves. Some founders are interested in the young, others in the old; some in negroes, othera
in whites; some in Americans of Anglo-Saxon blood, others in Americans of South European or Slavic blood. It would be impolitic to
refuse private non-legal assistance for Amexicans because limited to certain classes, when the classification has been made by
nature, a supra-human power.
One of these corporations is for negroes over 60 years of age.
But, negroes are a constituent of the population; and negroes over
60 years are also a constituent. It is contrary to the plainest policy, to
make charitable provislons for the various natural classes of the
general community, impossible or to dissuade from the creation of
such provisions, by withholding the exemption from state taxation.
Nearly the same observation may be made of the second charity.
The community contains people who without volition of their own,
are of Scotch descent, and who are 60 years of age. Why shall a
charity for this class be burdened with tax, because its resources
are not sufficient to respond to the needs of people of all descents
and races? Human beings do, in fact, feel more Interest in one subclass than in another, of the entire people, and to repress their charity because it was not universal in scope, would be foolish.
There is nothing new to add concerning the third corporation,
which dispenses charity to Hebrews. They are fellow-men, fellow
citizens probably; and the reason for repressing the charitable impulses of members of that race, by taxing the charity they create,
because they do not make it comprehend all races, is difficult to
appreciate.
We are drawn to the conclusion that these charities ought
to be encouraged and cannot convince ourselves that the purpose
of the people in the Constitution, or the legislature in statute, was
to withhold the encouragement that flows from exemption from
taxation. The state ought to be glad that any institutions help those
of its people, black, white, Scotch, German, whom it should help if
they did not.
The able opinion of the court below has lead it to a result that
we do not approve.
Reversed.
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DIX VS. FORGATY & HALE
Personal Property-Liens--Garage Owner's Lien Against Machine
Repaired-Creation of Lien by Bailee with Option to Purchase-SO Super. 462; 75 Super. 199;
279 Pa. 160 Cited.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Dix, owning an automobile, leased it to Fogarty, at a quarterly
rental, with the privilege of becoming the owner by paying in all
$1500. The auto was injured in a collision, and Fogarty put it for
repairing, into the possession of Hale, who made repairs for which
he claimed $150.
Fogarty not paying the agreed rent, this is replevin. Hale
claims the right to retain possession until paid.
Goldstein, for Plaintiff.
Grote, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Hallem, J. This is an action of replevin for an automobile upon
which Hale, one of the defendants, claims a lien by reason of work
done by him upon it. Plaintiff is the owner of the machine. It
was injured in a collision and was left with Hale for repairs by
Fogarty, the other defendant, who was in possession under a contract of lease or bailment with the right to purchase on certain
terms which were unperformed and in default at the time when
the writ issued. From the facts of the case it appears that the
machine was delivered to Hale without the knowledge or consent of
the owner.
The first question which we have to decide is whether this
case is one of bailment with an option to purchase or a conditional
sale. A bailment with an option to purchase on the part of the
bailee is merely a bailment, but if a bailment is coupled with an
agreement by which the bailee is bound to buy the transaction will
be treated as a conditional sale. From all the facts of this case we
will treat this agreement as a bailment with an option to purchase.
The second question which we are called upon to decide is
whether the delivery of personal property which is held under a bailment lease with an option to purchase to one to have repairs done
to it, is such conduct as will estop the owner from subsequently
asserting his title against one who has asserted a lien against it
and who has the property in his possession. Possession of personal
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property by a bailee for hire does not clothe him with such an apparent title or authority that enable the possessor to dispose of it
and create an estoppel preventing the true owner from asserting
his title. Our opinion on this case is governed by the decision in
Meyer & Bro. vs. Brattespiece 174 Pa. 119. It is there held: "Whenever a workman or artisan by his labor or skill increases the value
of personal property placed in his possession he has a lien upon
it for proper charges until paid, but in order to charge a chattel
with this lien the labor for which the lien is claimed must have
been done at the request of the owner or under circumstances from
which his assent can be reasonably implied; it does not extend to
one not in privity with the owner." This principal is so well settled that it is unnecessary to go further into the discussion. This
same principal was laid down in Estey Co. vs. Dick, 41 Pa. Superior
610, and was followed in Stern vs. Sica, 66 Pa. Superior 84, and Is
in force generally in other jurisdictions.
There was no express authority from the lessor to the bailee to
charge the property for the repairs made, nor was there any contractual relation between bailor and defendant Hale.
In order to lay the foundation for authority to subject the machaine to a lien, there should be more definite evidence of authority coning from the owner. It may arise by implication but the
facts from which the inference is to be drawn should be such as to
reasonably lead to but one conclusion. The legal relation of lessor and lessee of personal property would take on an aspect not
thought of by the parties if the bailee could create a lien for repair charges against property of which the owner had no knowledge
and could in no way control. Were this one of incidents to the
hiring of chattels, the title to such property would be held subject to a very unsatisfactory condition into which fraud and imposition might easily find their way. It Is true in this case that
the machine needed repairs but the owner should be the judge of
where, when, and how the repairs should be made.
The repairman cannot say that he is an innocent 3rd party,
and the loss should fall on him who made the transaction possible.
The repairman stands in no better position than the person who innocently buys, or leases, or temporarily receives as a pledge, property that has been stolen. The owner can follow and reclaim it
no matter where it be found. Easton vs. Worthington, 5 S. & R.
130.
As a general rule we can see no good reason why a party who
is not the owner of property should be permitted to create a lien
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upon it any more than he should be permitted to sell it. Sargent vs.
Usher 55 N. H. 287.
There Is nothing in the facts, nor any fair inference from the
facts stated, which would support any authority in the bailee to Impair the bailor's title by giving the property to a repairman, who imposes a lien thereon.
Defendant contends that the consent of the owner need not
be expressed, but may be reasonably inferred from the circumstances, and cited a number of cases to uphold this doctrine. Automobile Finance Co. vs. Markman et. al. 82 Pa. Superior 478, and
numerous others, but after a careful investigation of these cases
we find that the owner either had actual knowledge or the circumstances were such that consent could be Implied.
Possession is one of the incidents of a valid bailment. Possesion such as Fogarty had, was not inconsistent with the plaintiff's
title. Such a bailment makes it possible for a dishonest bailee to
either sell the article to an innocent purchaser, or in case of
Injury to the machine to deliver It to a repairman. In case of a
sale the true owner will not be estopped from asserting his ownership In goods in an action of replevin to regain possession. Posses:ion of a chattel is but prima facia evidence of ownership.
From our earliest decisions to the present, In practically all
the cases In which the facts were similar to the case at bar, the
courts of Pa. and of other jurisdictions have held, that the defendant cannot maintain his lien as against the plaintiff who is the
true owner.
In Pennsylvania at present, there is a Commission sitting to
prepare an act on the law of Conditional Sales. This submission
will be made to the Legislature. If this act is passed by the legislature it will do much toward aiding the courts In arriving at just
and fair conclusions in the law of bailments and conditional sales.
To sustain the arguments of the defendant would seemingly Interfere with the tremendous amount of business done throughout
the state on bailment leases, and property thus held would be at
the peril of the ballee. Our decisions must protect the true owner's
title as long as he does not knowingly permit the public to be deceived or misled.
From the facts as stated In the case at bar, considering the
circumstances surrounding it, we do not think that the bailee had
any authority over the bailor's property as would empower him to
subject it to the lien of the repairman.
Judgment for plaintiff.
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The automobile was let to Fogarty for a quarterly rental. The
option was also given to him to pay installments of rent amounting to $1500, and thus to become the owner. Until the condition
was fulfilled, on which Fogarty was to become owner, the automobile was Dix's. The condition on which it was to become Fogarty's
has not been fulfilled. Dix then, has the right to treat his right of
possession as ended, and to use replevin as a means of recovering
the auto.
Had Fogarty had Dix's authority to arrange for repairs by Hale,
he would have had a lien for the value of the repairs, valid even
as against Dix. But, Fogarty had no such authority. Hale took
the risk of the possession by Fogarty, of the right, as owner of the
machine, to cause the repairs to be made. Possibly he did not know
the nature of Fogarty's title. That does not increase his right
against Dix, who, under the law, could transfer possession of a
chattel, under a bailment, without in any way giving notice that
the transferee was only a bailee. When Hale did the work, his
right to compensation was a personal one against Fogarty, and only
a lien, if Fogarty owned the automobile, or had authority of the
owner, to cause the repairs to be made. See, Auto Security Co. vs.
Mlckens, 80 Super. 462; Leitch vs. Sanford Motor Truck Co., 279 Pa.
160; Bankers' Commercial Security Co. vs. Brennan, 75 Super. 199.
Affirmed.

HARRIS VS. HARRIS
DIvorce-Desertion as Grounds for a Divorce-Adultery as a Justification for Desertion-Act of March 13, 1815-80
Superior 469 Approved.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is a libel for divorce by Mr. Harris against his wife, Mrs.
Harris. The ground alleged is desertion. Mrs. Harris justifies her
abandonment of the home and refusal to live longer with the libellant on the ground that he had had adulterous relations with another
woman. This is found by the lower court to be true. After the
discovery of this relation, Mrs. Harris wholly refused to live longer
with her husband. The court below refused to grant the divorce.
Halliday, for Plaintiff.
Handler, for Defendant.

DICKINSON LAW

REVIEW

OPINION OF THE COURT
Johnson, J. Counsel for the libeilant contends that the divorce
should be granted because there has been established the desertion
of the wife, and he proceeds to enumerate the elements of desertion; cessation from cohabitation for the statutory period; an intention in the mind of the deserter not to resume cohabitation absence
of the other party's consent to the separation. It is not clear from
the facts that all of these elements are present. There is nothing
to show that the respondent has been absent from the habitation of
her husband for and during the space of two years. Even though
we were to consider the question in a light most favorable to the
libellant, assuming the absence of the respondent for the statutory
period, we are unable to find sufficient cause for the granting of a
divorce.
Desertion within the meaning of the Act of 1815 is defined
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to be "When either shall
have committed willful and malicious desertion, and absence from
the habitation of the other, without reasonable cause, for and during
the space and term of two years." Therefore mere separation is
The act requires that
not desertion. (Allen vs. Allen, 194 Pa. 419).
the desertion be "willful and malicious," and it has been frequently
decided that the elements of willfulness and malice are essential,
and that the guilty intent is manifest, when ,without cause or consent, either party withdraws from the residence of the other, and
the desertion is an actually albandonment of matrimonial cohabitation, with an intent to desert willfully and maliciously, and persisted in for two years without cause. (Hartner vs. Hartner, 75 Pa.
Sup. 842.)
This court is satisfied that the only question for solution here
is whether or not respondent abandoned her husband with reasonable cause. Sturgeon says that "the reasonable cause which will
Justify a husband or wife in quitting and abandoning each other,
is that, and only that which would entitle the party so separating
himself or herself to a divorce." This doctrine of the English
Ecclesiastical Courts has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Butler vs. Butler, 4 Clark 284, and in Detricks Appeal, 117 Pa. 452.
The Act of March 13, 1815, declares adultery to be a ground for
divorce. This point needs no elaboration by this court.
We think there is no merit in libellant's contention that one
instance of adultery is insufficient to constitute reasonable cause for
the abandonment by the respondent of her husband. Adultery is
defined (by Webster) to be the violation of the marriage bed; the
unfaithfulness of any married person to the marriage bed; the
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voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with one of the
opposite sex. There is not a fixed number of times of unfaithfulness on the part of one of the parties, required to constitute adultery. Adultery is adultery, whether it occurs once or a hundred
times.
We think respondent would have a good ground for divorce, sufficient to constitute a reasonable cause for the desertion
of her husband. Under our law the libellant is not entitled to a
divorce.
For the reasons given the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME

COURT

The clear opinion of the learned court below leaves little occasion for extended discussion by us. The conclusion reached is
sustained by Gites vs. Gites, 80 Superior 469, the able opinion of
which was written by Judge Gawthrop. Affirmed.

MOORE

VS. WILLIMSON

Practice--Entry of Judgment on Warrant of Attorney-Entry
Judgment as Security Before Debt-Execution-153 Pa.

of

488 and 80 Sup. 487 Approved.
STATEMENT OF PACTS
Williamson made three notes each for $500 payable April 1,
1925, April 1, 1926, and April 1, 1927. He gave a bond for $3000 to
Moore as collateral security, payable April 1, 1927. On the warrant
of attorney on the bond, Moore had judgment entered for $3000 on
July 2nd 1924. This is an application by Williamson to the court
to strike off the judgment.
The lower court refused to do so and the case has come to this
court on appeal.
Lieberman, for Plaintiff.
Lilienfeld, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Monheit, J.
The bond, although given as collateral, gives the
holder the right to have Judgment entered but this does not work
any more hardship on the defendant than had no judgment been entered in the first place. It is held in Integrity Insurance and Saf
Deposit Co. vs. Rau et al, 153 Pa. 488, that in the absence of restriction or condition to the contrary, judgment may be entered
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upon a warrant of attorney accompanying a bond before the maturity of the debt; but execution cannot issue until default in payment. In the present case the creditor did no more than enter
judgment on the bond and in doing so was within his strict legal
rights and the court has no authority to interfere with his action.
As security, the creditor is entitled to as large a collateral and as
many different forms of it as the parties choose to contract for.
That is a matter with which the court cannot interfere, but the
enforcement of satisfaction by execution or otherwise is a matter to
be governed by the rights and equities of the parties and comes
within the jurisdiction of the court.
Though the bond is in terms of immediate payment, its subsequent provisions show that it is only to be collected upon default
in the payment of the notes. In 80 Sup. 487, it is stated, that the
authority to confess judgment is immediate although the execution
cannot issue until default.
In the case at bar there were no limitations, restrictions or conditions in the warrant of attorney as to the time of the entry of
judgment and in the absence of such, judgment may be entered on
the bond, 143 Pa. 575.
We feel that the lower court was justified in its holding and in
the case at bar we find no material or substantial difference from
that in 153 Pa. 488. The two cases are almost identical. The very
question in that case was the same as the question in this
case.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME

COURT

The promissory notes were payable April 1, 1925; April 1, 1926;
and April 1, 1927. A bond was given for $3000 as collateral security,
payable April 1, 1927. On the warrant of attorney, judgment for
$3000 has been entered, July 2, 1924. None of the debts were then
due. The only question is, was it improper thus to enter judgment
before the debts secured by the bond were due.
Nothing indicates that the parties agreed that the judgment
was not to be entered until the notes had all become payable.
The cases referred to show that it was not improper thus to
enter the judgment, Integrity Title Ins. etc. Co. vs. Rau, 153 Pa.
488; Chubb vs. Kelly, 80 Super. 487.
The execution may not issue until the default of the defendant; but the judgment on the warrant has value. It may be a lien
on real property. It also makes swift executon on default, practicable.
The judgment of the learned trial court is affirmed.
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BOWMAN'S ESTATE
Wills--Act of June 7, 1917, Sec. 6--Charitable Bequests-Bequests to
Donee Who is Head of the Charity-Stare Decisis
270 Pa. 101 Approved.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Bowman made a will on April 10, 1923, in which he bequeathed
$1000 to an Episcopal School. He was In feeble health and fearing
that he might die within a calendar month after making the will,
he in a later clause provided: "The aforesaid gift Is conditional on
my living two months, and should I not, I give the $1000 to Dr. Stone.
Dr. Stone was head master of the school. No one interested in the
school had had communication with Bowman. He had had no
communication with Dr. Stone direct or indirect. Dr. Stone admits that he will feel in honor bound to pay the money over to the
school. Bowman died 15 days after making the will. The court
awarded the $1000 to Dr. Stone.
Fellows, for Plaintiff.
McKeown, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Moon, J. The decision of this case rests upon the construction
of the Statute of April 26, 1855, P. L. 329, 4 Purd. 4113, See. 23 as
reenacted by the Wills Act of 1917. It follows: "No estate, real or
personal, shall hereafter be bequeathed, devised, or conveyed to
any body politic, or to any person in trust for religious or charitable uses, except the same be done by will, or deed, attested by two
creditable, and at the time, disinterested witnesses, at least one calendar month before the decease of the testator or alienor, and all
dispositions of property contrary hereto shall be void and go to
the residuary legatees or devisees, next of kin or heirs according to
law.
Let us look at a few analogous cases.
In Schultz's Appeal, 80 Pa. 396, the gift was regarded as a gift
to the donee individually although he was informed of the death
of the testator and stated that he would carry out the wishes of
the deceased.
In Hodnett's Estate, 154 Pa. 485, the court held that In absence
of any evidence of facts or circumstances tending to establish a
trust for either a religious or charitable organization, the legacy was
a personal bequest to the pastor of the church, and not affected by
the act of April 26, 1855, making void bequests to charitable uses
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executed less than one calendar month before the death of the
testator. Flood vs. Ryan, 220 Pa. 451, reiterates the same doctrine.
What was the intention of the testator In this case? It appears clearly that the testator intended to make a gift to the Episcopal School upon his death. In some manher he learned of the Act
of April 26, 1855, and being In poor health sought a way to insure
that the gift would reach the school. Therefore he added a conditional clause to his will, that should he not live two months, the
gift should go to Dr. Stone. The question now arises, did the testator Intend to make the gift to Dr. Stone in order to evade the
statute.
If we are to follow the doctrine of stare decisis, the court must
decide in favor of Dr. Stone. From the citations above the learned
courts evidently did not think that the testator intended to evade the
statute.
A brilliant and lengthy review of the principles involved in
the case at bar has been written by Justice Simpson in his opinion
in Bickley's Estate 270 Pa, 101.
We are heartily In accord with the views of Justice Simpson
and believe that much can be said in respect to the policy of the
law as expressed in the Act of 1855. The Act is a remedial statute
and the evil it has in mind is to prevent the importunities of designing persons who may induce dispositions of property contrary
to natural justice, without regard to the ties of kinship which under
normal conditions would be operative on the mind of the testator.
See Kessler's Estate 221 Pa. 321.
For the court to award the gift to Dr. Stone would appear to
allow the testator to do indirectly what he could not do directly.
However, it is very clear that the bequest In the will of Bowman is
not literally within the statute, for the charity intended to be benefited has no claim, legal or equitable, to force Dr. Stone to pay
the money over to the school due to the fact that he never had
been in communication with the testator.
When a testator bequeaths a gift to a stranger without the latter's knowledge of the testator's wishes, the court cannot infer that
a secret trust has been conferred upon the stranger for he is not
compelled to carry out the testator's wishes. Therefore the gift is
not affected by the Act of 1855. It matters not to the court what
the donee does with the gift awarded by the testator. The court
does not take cognizance of anything beyond the will.
The court is of the opinion that the court below did not err in
awarding $1000 to Dr. Stone.
The judgment is affirmed.
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OPINION OF SUPREME

COURT

The 6th section of the Wills Act of June 7, 1917, directs that no
estate shall be bequeathed to any person "in trust for religious or
charitable uses" except the same be done at least 30 days before
the decease of the testator.
No bequest in trust for any purpose has been made in this
case. The statute then has not been violated. Talk of evasion of
the statute Is irrelevant. A man does not evade a statute forbidding
There may have been as good a reason
act A when he does act B.
to forbid B as A, but whether the policy which covers A, also covers
B, is for the legislature to perceive and declare. It would be highly
Impolitic to permit a court to forbid an act which the legislature
has not forbidden, because it, the court, thinks that there is as good
a reason to forbid it, as to forbid the act which has been forbidden
by the legislature.
The court could easily attain the result that it desires, by reforming Its definition of "trust" and by discovering in the relations
of Dr. Stone to the testator and the Episcopal School, that of trustee
and cestui que trust. It has not chosen to do so. Hence the bequest to Stone is valid. He is not a trustee.
The decree of the learned court below is well supported by
Bickley's Estate, 270 Pa. 101.
The appeal is therefore dismissed.

MATEER VS. COLLINS
Evidence-Best Evidence Rue--Constitutional Privilege of Non-Incrimination of Self-Fictitious Names-Right of Recovery
in Civil Suit--Act of June 28, 1917 P. L. 645 As
Amended by Act of May 10, 1921,
P. L 465.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mateer carried on business under the name of the "Mateer Company." Collins, purchaser of goods to the valtie of $250, has not paid
for them. In this suit he defends on the ground that the plaintiff
had not registered the fictitious name in the office of the Secretary
under
of the Commonwealth, and of the Prothonotary of the County,
prove
to
proposed
Defendant
645.
L.
P.
1917,
28,
June
of
the Act
the failure to register by cross-examining Mateer. He declined to
answer bn the ground that his answer might Incriminate himself.
The court did not compel him to answer.

It also refused to charge
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that the jury might legitimately infer non-compliance with the
law. On the contrary it said that the defendant should furnish evidence of non-compliance by certificate or testimony from the offices of the Secretary and the Prothonotary. Verdict for the plaintiff. Motion for judgment N. 0. V.
Compton, for Plaintiff.
Miss Ainey, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
The Act of June 28, 1917, P. L. 645, provides a
Miss Cohn, J.
fine and imprisonment for conducting a business under an assumed
name without having first registered it with the Secretary of the
Commonwealth, and the Prothonotary of the proper county.
The amending Act of May 10, 1921, P. IL. reads as follows:
"Provided that the failure of any such person or persons to file
the certificate aforesaid * * * * shall not impair or affect the validity of any contract with such person or persons, and actions oL
proceedings at law or in equity may be instituted and maintained
on any such contract * * * * . And provided further, before any
such person or persons can Institute any action * * * * such person
a license fee
shall pay to the Secretary of the Commonwealth * ***
or fine of $25. * * * * Provided, that the plaintiffs is any such suit
shall pay all costs accrued prior to compliance with the provisions
of this act."
The question is whether a plaintiff In an action under a name
which Is in fact fictitious, can be compelled to answer whether he had
registered in compliance with the Act of June 28, 1917, supra, when,
in the opinion of the trial judge, such answer might incriminate
him.
The fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
and Article One, Section Nine, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania,
expressly declare that citizens shall be immune from compulsory
might
If literally construed these provisions
self-incrimination.
seem to apply only to criminal prosecutions. Nevertheless, the
failure to extend the privilege to civil causes would render the constitutional provisions nugatory, 14 Indiana 453.
We quote from the opinion of that court as follows:
"Literally the provisions extends to criminal prosecutions only
and not to civil actions; but we think Its spirit and intent go much
farther and protect a person from a compulsory disclosure in a
civil suit of facts tending to Incriminate the party whenever his
answer could be given in evidence against him In a subsequent
criminal

prosecution."
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The act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158, 161, Section 10 leaves no room
for misconstruction. It reads as follows:
"Except a defendant actually on trial in criminal court any
competent witness may be compelled to testify in any proceeding
civil or criminal, but he may not be compelled to answer any question which in the opinion of the trial judge would tend to incrliminate him."
The plaintiff merely avails himself of a lawful privilege.
McFadden vs. Reynolds, 11 Atlantic Rep. 638, (Pa.)
Mr. Justice VonMoschzisker, in 269 Pa. 60, held that the plaintiff need not answer, and in Lamb vs. Condon, 276 Pa. 544, it was
said by the court:
"The act of June 28, 1917 was not intended to relieve debtors of
their honest obligations. The statute was intended to protect persons giving credit in reliance on the assumed or fictitious name,
and to definitely establish the identity of the individuals owning the
business, for the information of those who might have dealings with
the concern."
We cannot consider the contrary decisions in 3 D. & C. 650, and
in 4 D. & C. 813, specially stressed by the learned counsel for the
defendant, as we feel constrained to follow the decisions of the
highest court in Pennsylvania.
In our opinion the court properly refused the say "that the
jury might legitimately infer non-compliance with the law because
Otherwise the plaintiff's imof the plaintiff's failure to answer."
munity conferred by the Act of May 23, 1887 supra, would be wiped
out. Feldgus vs. Friedman 269 Pa. 60; Phelin vs. Kenderline 20 Pa.
354.
It would be the height of absurdity to presume that the law
would confer a right, and then tax the individual for availing himself of that right.
When the court declared that "the defendant should furnish
evidence of non-compliance by certificate or testimony from the
offices of the Secretary of the Commonwealth and of the Prothonotary," it was merely observing a well known rule of law-that the
highest degree of proof of which the case from Its nature is suscept466--B;
ible, must, if accessible, be produced. 17 Corpus Juris
Greenleaf on Evidence 170; Feldgus vs. Friedman Supra.
To quote from those authorities:
to
"When the fact to be proved is one which the law requires
copy
authenticated
appear of record, the record itself or a properly
is the best evidence, and parol evidence cannot be received to prove
or is for
the fact, except where the record is lost or destroyed,
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other reasons inaccessible, and a properly authenticated copy cannot
be obtained."
In view of the authorities above cited, the motion for judgment
N. 0. V. is refused.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The carrying on of business under a ficitious name which is not
registered, is punishable with fine and inprisonment, Act of June 28,
1917. The amendment of May 10, 1921, makes no change In this
respect. Under the first act, no recovery by the plaintiff on any
contract made while the statute was being violated was permitted.
The act of 1921 makes it possible for the plaintiff to atone for his
violation of the act of 1917 by paying $25 to, the Secretary of the
Commonwealth after the contract was made. Thereupon his right
to maintain suit begins.
How is the omission to register the name or names of the real
plaintiff to be proved? Here the effort was to compel the plaintiff to furnish the evidence. He has declined to do so, since, In
doing so, he would be imputing to himself a crime. He cannot be
compelled to do this, not in virtue of the Constitution of the United
States which has no application to procedure in state tribunals, but
in virtue of a similar provision of the Constitution of PennsylvaniaIn not compelling a plaintiff to incriminate himself the court loyally carried out the requirement of the Constitution.
The court properly refused to say that the plaintiff's violation of
the statute might be inferred from his refusal to testify. Other reasons then consciousness of guilt might have prompted the refusal
to testify. The best evidence capable of being found in the offices
of the prothonotary or secretary of the Commonwealth should have
been resorted to. The opinion of the learned court below sufficiently
justifies its conclusion and the judgment is affirmed.

HOOPER VS. R. IL CO.
Evidence--Improper Cross-Examination-Deprecation of Expert Medical Witness' Ability-When Objection Mlust Be Made-Waiver of Right of Objection.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In crossing a track of the defendant In a wagon, the plaintiff
was run into by an engine of the defendant, under circumstances
showing negligence by the company-excessive speed, failure to blow
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whistle, etc.

A physician Z, who attended Hooper, the plaintiff,

testified as to the nature of the injury, its permanence, and extent to
which his power to work has been reduced. The company called
Doctor X, another physician to express an opinion depreciatory of
the skill and learning of Doctor Z, and his competence to make a
reliable forecast of the effect of the injury. The verdict being for
a sum of money not satisfactory to Hooper, he appeals.
Almond, for Plaintiff.
Amder, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Best, J. This is an appeal from the lower court setting forth as
error the acceptance of testimony tending to impeach the testimony
of an expert witness, a doctor of medicine. The reason for the
appeal as alleged by the plaintiff is that the impeachment of the
testimony of Doctor Z by Doctor X so influenced the jury that they
returned a verdict for a lesser sum than they would have, had it
not been for the testimony.
However this may be the plaintiff can have no remedy in this
court. His proper mode of procedure would have been an objection
in the lower court to the impeachment of Doctor Z's testimony and
if this were not sustained, a request to withdraw a juror. Mackin
vs. Patterson, 270 Pa. 107.
Where no objection is made to testimony at the time it is
offered, the refusal of the trial judge to strike It out cannot be
reviewed upon appeal. In such case, thd proper remedy is a request by counsel to withdraw a Juror. Weller vs. Davis, 245 Pa.
280; and in the case of Benson vs. Altoona & Logan Valley R. R.
Co., 228 Pa. 290, it was held that where counsel makes no request
for the withdrawal of a juror because of an improper remark of his
adversary, it will be assumed that he is satisfied with a warning
given by the trial judge to the jury to disregard the objectionable remark.
Since no objection was made at the trial in the court below
and no request was made to withdraw a juror we nmust consider
the objection as waived. Having waived the objection on the trial
of the case the plaintiff cannot be heard to state that objection on
appeal.
No other ground for reversal having been stated we must conclude that the judgment of the lower court is correct and under
the authority of 270 Pa. 107, we order the judgment of the lower court
to be affirmed.
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
case is whether one physician,
The question presented by tlis
A. can depreciate the value of another physician, B's, testimony by
denigration of his professional ability. We think he cannot. Both
have the license of the state to practice medicine. If rival doctors
can come Into court and depreciate each other's ability, the spectacle
will not be conducive to the edification of the public or to the enlightenment of the jurors. Witness B. disputes A's capacity. Then
Dr. C may be called to assail the merits of Dr. B, and so on, ad Infinitum. Rivalries and jealousies would ganz too wide a scope for displaying themselves were this allowed. The opinion of Dr. B as to the
capacity of Dr. A to form a trustworthy opinion, should not be
heard, Mackin vs. Patterson, 270 Pa. 107.
The learned court below has shunted this question by suggesting
that no exception was taken by the plaintiff to the reception of th6
evidence complained of. That there should be an exception Is too
plain to be controverted, but, in the preparation of statements, some
things are to be assumed. It would have been better, doubtless,
to swell somewhat the bulk of the case, by stating that the court
received the evidence despite the objection of the plaintiff. However, as the principle Is correct that a party cannot complain of adnfitted evidence, unless in some way, he has manifested his objection to It, the Judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.
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BOOK REVIEWS
Cases in Equity, Vol. 3, by Walter Wheeler Cook, Professor of Law, Yale University, 1924. The West Publishing Company, St. Paul Minn.
The classification of material arrests attention, and the
statement of it will give a better conception of the scope and
plan of the book than would be otherwise attainable. The
cases are arranged in five parts, whose titles are as follows:
Part 1, Mistake, including misrepresentation and non-disclosure; Part 2, Benefits conferred under agreements which
have been wholly or partially performed; Part 3, Benefits
conferred under compulsion and undue influence; Part 4,
Benefits conferred under intervention in another's affairs
which is not regarded as officious intermeddling; and Part 5,
Benefits obtained by the wrongful use of another's property.
The book contains over 1000 pages. The cases are well
selected and ample in number. They compose a repertory
from which thorough courses in the subjects embraced in
it may be extracted by the instructor. It is a valuable addition
to the series of case-books published by the enterprising
house which for lawyers has made St. Paul, Minn., famous.
Cases on Principal and Agent and Master and Servant;
2nd edition, by Edwin C. Goddard, Ph.B. LL.B, Professor of
Law in the University of Michigan. The West Publishing
Company, St. Paul Minn., 1925.
The compiler of this collection has embraced in it a
considerable number of cases on Master and Servant. He
has also printed the English and the Michigan Workman's
Compensation acts and a considerable number of decisions upon these acts. We hardly think that the apology for their inclusion, given by the learned compiler, is necessary. The
materials of the book are arranged under four parts: Part
1, subdivided into five chapters, treats of the nature of the
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relation of agency, the parties to it, the purposes of it, the
methods of creating it, and of terminating it. Part II treats
of the authority of the agent, its nature and extent, the construction of it, the execution of the authority, the delegation
of it. Part III deals with the effects and consequences of
the relation, the duties of the agent to the principal, the duties
of the principal to the agent, the agent's liability to third,
parties, the liability of third parties to the agent, the liability
of the principal to third persons, the liability of third persons
to the principal. In Part IV are found the Workman's Compensation statutes of England and Michigan and decisions dealing with sundry questions arising thereunder.
The collection of cases is comprehensive, and most of the
salient adjudications are found in it.

